Es hat in der Geschichte der Ethik fortgesetzte Versuche gegeben, diese und andere moralische Überzeugungen von einem einheitlichen theoretischen Prinzip des Moralischen abzuleiten, nämlich von der Pflicht, das Gute zu tun („Sittlichkeit“). Man kann dies mit Kant deontologisch tun und dabei von einer Pflicht sich selbst gegenüber ausgehen ... (Rüdiger Funiok)
Tugendhat, Ernst. Vorlesungen über Ethik. 8. Aufl. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1100. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012.
Hier glaubte nun Kant, das Problem wie das Ei des Kolumbus lösen zu können, indem er vorschlug, die moralischen Urteile auf eine Prämisse zu begründen, die einfach die Idee des Begründetseins selbst darstellt, die Vernunft. Wenn man nur überhaupt vernünftig ist, so kann man seine Idee zusammenfassen, müsse man die Geltung der moralischen Urteile – bzw. derjenigen moralischen Urteile, die Kant für richtig hielt – anerkennen. ... Aus der Idee des Begründetseins als solcher kann, wenn man sich darunter überhaupt etwas vorstellen kann, überhaupt nichts Inhaltliches folgen. Außerdem werden wir noch sehen, dass nicht nur die Idee eines nicht mehr bedingten Begründetseins von oben, sondern auch die Idee, dass das moralische Sollen (oder Müssen) einen nicht bedingten Sinn hat – dass es irgendwie absolut über uns lastet, wie eine säkularisierte Stimme Gottes – sinnwidrig ist. (S. 24f)
Indem wir einsehen, dass das moralische Bewusstsein erst das Ergebnis eines – natürlich nicht unmotivierten – 'ich will' ist, überwinden wir die von fast allen traditionellen Ethiken – insbesondere der Kantischen – gemachte Annahme, das moralische Bewusstsein sei etwas in unser Bewusstsein von Natur eingerammtes. Es ist diese Annahme, die dazu geführt hat, die Moral, sei es von der menschlichen 'Natur' überhaupt, sei es von einem Aspekt von ihr wie der 'Vernunft', irgendwie ableiten zu wollen. (S. 62f)
Extrakt aus: Hansson, Sven Ove, Hrsg.The ethics of technology: methods and approaches. Philosophy, technology and society. London ; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd, 2017. S. 1ff
What does the term “applied” in “applied ethics” signify? It can be instructively compared to other applied disciplines. In applied mathematics, a mathematical theory is used to solve some problem outside of pure mathematics. The theory itself is not changed or significantly extended in the process of its application (Kopelman 1990). Similarly, applied physics makes extensive use of physical theory but does not aim at contributing to its development. In the same way, applied ethics can be seen as a discipline, or collection of disciplines, in which moral theory is used as a tool to solve moral problems in various practical areas. Some moral philosophers have indeed furthered that approach. Bernard Gert (1982, p. 51) defined applied ethics as “the application of an ethical theory to some particular moral problems or set of problems.” The most renowned proponent of this view is Peter Singer, who advocates the use of utilitarian moral theory to determine what is right and wrong in bioethics and other areas of applied ethics. However, most researchers in the various areas of applied ethics, including the ethics of technology, do not seem to concur (Beauchamp 1984; MacIntyre 1984; Pihlström 1999).
There are at least three serious problems with the idea that area-specific ethics should consist in the application of an ethical theory.
theory choice problem
The first of these is the theory choice problem. There are quite a few moral theories around, and despite centuries of discussion moral philosophers have not managed to agree on which of them is right. To put it somewhat bluntly, moral philosophers tend to agree that one of the available moral theories is the one and only, correct theory. However, they do not agree on which that theory is. Therefore, the project of basing practical ethics on moral theory faces essentially the same problem as that of basing it on religion. Proponents of different religions tend to agree that there is one particular religion to which we should turn for guidance on moral and other issues, but they disagree on which that religion is. For applied ethicists, the prevailing disagreement on which is the right moral theory can make the approach of “applying moral theory” seem arbitrary. This is in sharp contrast to applied mathematics and physics, both of which build on thoroughly validated theories that are not subject to serious doubt.
derivation problem
The second problem is the derivation problem. For a moral theory to be useful in the intended way for applications, it would have to provide sufficient information for determining what is right and wrong in the various practical cases that applied ethicists are expected to analyze. When we have the facts of a case, it should be possible to combine these facts with the theory in question and derive univocally a determinate answer to our moral questions. However, this type of derivation does not usually work in practice since fundamental moral theories have surprisingly little to say on the problems that are the focus in applied ethics. This has become particularly evident in biomedical ethics. Experience shows that the moral theory a philosopher adheres to has little or no predictive power for her standpoints on concrete bioethical issues (Kymlicka 1993; Heyd 1996). You can for instance find a utilitarian and a deontologist who agree on most of the ethical issues in health care, although they have different underpinnings for their standpoints. Similarly, two adherents of the same moral theory can disagree vehemently on practical moral issues since they apply it in different ways. The reason for this is that moral theories operate on an abstract level, and most practical moral problems cannot be connected in an unequivocal way to principles or standpoints on that level. For instance, deontologists can disagree on what duties we have and how they should be interpreted, and utilitarians can disagree in multifarious ways on the utilities of different outcomes (Hansson 2014b). The upshot is that even if we manage to choose one of the many available moral theories as the basis for applied ethics, that theory will not provide us with clear-cut answers to our ethical questions. This, again, is very different from the application of mathematical or physical theories that are essentially devoid of such ambiguities.
moral novelty problem
Thirdly, we have the moral novelty problem. Ideally, moral theories are thought of as timeless. If there is a unique, correct moral theory, then a sufficiently sagacious ancient thinker should — in principle — have been able to discover it. But the timelessness of moral theories can be put to serious doubt. Developments in human society unceasingly provide us with moral novelties, that is, new problems that cannot be solved with the existing moral theories. Some of the most pressing problems in modern medical ethics, such as brain death and human enhancement, require considerations of issues that had not been covered in previously presented moral theories. The problem of moral novelties is also pervasive in the ethics of technology, due to its strong focus on new and emerging technologies, some of which have aspects that preexisting moral theories do not cover. This can be seen, for instance, from the discussions on information technology, virtual reality, space travel, and biotechnology, all of which refer to issues not foreseen in preexisting moral theories. Here as well we can note a stark contrast to mathematical and physical theory, both of which have a strong claim to timelessness.
Applied ethics is far from the only applied discipline that fails to satisfy the strict definition of application referred to above. Most forms of applied science include the creation of genuinely new theory, for the simple reason that the theories developed in the basic sciences do not suffice for solving the applied problems. This is true, for instance, of applied linguistics and applied psychology. Arguably, application in the strict sense of using a theory as a tool without changing it is only possible if the theory in question is broad and exceptionless enough to cover unaided a whole area of knowledge. Major mathematical and physical theories answer to that description, but they seem to be the exception rather than the rule. As we have seen, a strong case can be made that ethical theory in its current form is not suitable for pure application. This does not necessarily mean that we should give up the term “applied ethics,” but we may have to define it differently than what we did above. The word “apply” also has the more general meaning of putting something to use. The ethics of technology is certainly ethics put to use, and the same is true of medical ethics, research ethics, etc. If application is interpreted in this way, as putting to use, then the term “applied ethics” is uncommitted on what role—if any—moral theory should have.
However, before throwing moral theories overboard, we need to consider carefully what we want to put in their place. Academic ethics should be able to provide a systematized account of our well-considered moral judgments and their implications. Moral theories are highly useful to achieve such systematicity. Presumably, we do not wish to be thrown back to just collecting and reporting prevailing moral opinions on the various issues we are studying. If we give up the idea of conducting applied ethics as a straightforward application of moral theory, then we need to find either some other way to use moral theories, or some other means than moral theories to achieve systematicity and cohesion.
REPLACEMENTS FOR MORAL THEORIES
Another response to the difficulties in using moral theories in area-specific work is to replace them by principles that provide more distinct guidance in the respective areas. This is the approach commonly taken in medical ethics, whose “standard” approach is based on the following four principles:
- Autonomy: “Personal autonomy is, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling interferences by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent a meaningful choice.”
- Non-maleficence: “The principle of nonmaleficence asserts an obligation not to inflict harm on others.”
- Beneficence: “Morality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously and refrain from harming them, but also that we contribute to their welfare.”
- Justice is “fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due or owed to persons.” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, pp. 58, 113, 165, 226)
Various practices and rules in medical ethics can be justified by these four principles. For instance, the requirement of the patient’s informed consent for medical interventions is based on the principle of autonomy, and the requirement to offer treatment to all in need is based on the principle of justice. These principles form the basis of the ethical education of most physicians and other health-care personnel, and they are continuously referred to in ethical committees around the globe. The term “principlism” was introduced by Clouser and Gert (1990) to denote the ethical discourse that is based on them (Beauchamp 1995, p. 186).
The four principles are usually conceived as intermediate between “low- level” particular judgments and “high-level” moral theories such as utilitarianism and deontology. However, the practical employment of the four principles does not hinge on their inclusion in a larger structure that also includes some moral theory. Probably, most users of the principles lack a importance of the principles will have to be resorted to. Largely for that reason, principlism tends to be less popular among moral philosophers than among practicing physicians. The following is a forceful expression of that criticism:
Our general contention is that the so-called “principles” function neither as adequate surrogates for moral theories nor as directives or guides for determining the morally correct action. Rather they are primarily chapter headings for a discussion of some concepts which are often only superficially related to each other. . . . The principles of Rawls and Mill are effective summaries of their theories; they are shorthand for the theories that generated them. However, this is not the case with principlism, because principlism often has two, three, or even four competing “principles” involved in a given case, for example, principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. This is tantamount to using two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case. Indeed some of the “principles”—for example, the “principle” of justice—contain within themselves several competing theories. (Clouser and Gert 1990, p. 221)
Some ethicists have wished to apply principlism to the ethics of technology. However, it has not always been realized that — with the possible exception of the ethics of medical technology — this will require extensive reworking of the principles. A major reason for this is that clinical decision making has its focus on an individual patient, whereas decisions on technology often concern large and diverse groups of people who may well have conflicting interests. For instance, the practice of informed consent cannot be transferred from clinical medicine to the context of technological innovation and development, since it would give single individuals veto power to stop projects with large advantages for many others (Hansson 2006). The formulation of principlism for (various forms of) technology remains to be performed. It may very wellbe a worthwhile undertaking.
IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OR ETHICAL ACTIVISM?
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Statements made in ethics can be divided into four major categories:
Type 1: Empirical statements about nonnormative matter.
Type 2: Empirical statements about normative standpoints (such as psychological, sociological and historical reports about people’s normative attitudes).
Type 3: Analytical statements about normative standpoints (such as assertions about their implications and how they relate to other such standpoints).
Type 4: Advocacy of normative statements.
Statements of type 1 are important in ethics, since our ethical standpoints in concrete issues depend crucially on our factual beliefs about the world. For instance, in order to discuss the ethical aspects of climate policies we need to have a solid basis in climate science. Although it is not a task for ethicists to determine the validity of such statements, it is up to ethicists to summarize and present them in ways that clarify their ethical implications.
Statements of type 2 are also important since many forms of ethical reasoning require adjustments to the standpoints of others. However, although statements of types 1 and 2 have important roles in ethics, they draw primarily on other competences than those of ethicists.
In contrast, statements of type 3 appertain to the core competences of ethicists. As ethicists we can identify normative issues and separate them out from complexes that have both normative and nonnormative components. We can dig out hidden assumptions and nonobvious implications, and we can point out alternative standpoints and clarify the differences. All of this can have an impact on the ethical judgments of those who take our counsel, but it can nevertheless be performed in the traditional academic spirit of striving to be as fair as possible to all standpoints and trying to identify one’s own biases and discuss them openly.
Statements of type 4 are different. When advocating normative standpoints we transcend the traditional limits of scholarship. Obviously there is nothing wrong with advocacy or activism in ethical issues, but in some circumstances it can reduce the credibility and therefore, also the impact of scholarly work that is reported in the same text or presentation. A common countermeasure is to clearly distinguish between what one says as a scholar, striving to be impartial between different standpoints, and as a proponent of one of these standpoints.
However, there are two categories of normative statements that can usually be made without reservations. One is the category of uncontroversial morally wrong, we need not signal that we are making normative statements; these are assumptions that we can expect to be shared by all reasonable discussants. (This approach to uncontroversial norms is paralleled in other academic disciplines. Legal scholars usually take adherence to the rule of lawfor granted, and political scientists tend to do the same with human rights and basic democratic principles.)
The other exception is normative statements that follow from the consensus view in an area with well-established ethical canons. There are two such areas, namely, medical ethics and research ethics. For instance, we can without hesitation say that it is unethical to administer a drug surreptitiously in a mentally competent person’s food, or to expose an unprepared research subject to an incident that makes her fear for her life. In a professional ethics context, the proviso “according to the consensus in medical/research ethics” is mostly self-evident and therefore superfluous. As ethicists we have a valid claim to expertise in norm-related issues of type 3, that is, analytical issues concerning norms. In contrast, we have no such claim in issues of type 4, that is, the actual choice of a normative standpoint. However, we have the same right as everyone else to express our opinions in those issues. We should feel perfectly free to do so, but it is a matter of professional responsibility never to profess an expertise that we do not possess.