Es hat in der Geschichte der Ethik fortgesetzte Versuche gegeben, diese und andere moralische Überzeugungen von einem einheitlichen theoretischen Prinzip des Moralischen abzuleiten, nämlich von der Pflicht, das Gute zu tun (,„Sittlichkeit“ - vgl. 1.2.3). Man kann dies mit Kant deontologisch tun und dabei von einer Pflicht sich selbst gegenüber ausgehen ... (Rüdiger Funiok)
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Tugendhat, Ernst. Vorlesungen über Ethik. 8. Aufl. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1100. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012.
Hier glaubte nun Kant, das Problem wie das Ei des Kolumbus lösen zu können, indem er vorschlug, die moralischen Urteile auf eine Prämisse zu begründen, die einfach die Idee des Begründetseins selbst darstellt, die Vernunft. Wenn man nur überhaupt vernünftig ist, so kann man seine Idee zusammenfassen, müsse man die Geltung der moralischen Urteile – bzw. derjenigen moralischen Urteile, die Kant für richtig hielt – anerkennen. ... Aus der Idee des Begründetseins als solcher kann, wenn man sich darunter überhaupt etwas vorstellen kann, überhaupt nichts Inhaltliches folgen. Außerdem werden wir noch sehen, dass nicht nur die Idee eines nicht mehr bedingten Begründetseins von oben, sondern auch die Idee, dass das moralische Sollen (oder Müssen) einen nicht bedingten Sinn hat – dass es irgendwie absolut über uns lastet, wie eine säkularisierte Stimme Gottes – sinnwidrig ist. (S. 24f)
Indem wir einsehen, dass das moralische Bewusstsein erst das Ergebnis eines – natürlich nicht unmotivierten – 'ich will' ist, überwinden wir die von fast allen traditionellen Ethiken – insbesondere der Kantischen – gemachte Annahme, das moralische Bewusstsein sei etwas in unser Bewusstsein von Natur eingerammtes. Es ist diese Annahme, die dazu geführt hat, die Moral, sei es von der menschlichen 'Natur' überhaupt, sei es von einem Aspekt von ihr wie der 'Vernunft', irgendwie ableiten zu wollen. (S. 62f)
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Thirdly, we have the moral novelty problem. Ideally, moral theories are thought of as timeless. If there is a unique, correct moral theory, then a sufficiently sagacious ancient thinker should—in principle—have been able to discover it. But the timelessness of moral theories can be put to serious doubt. Developments in human society unceasingly provide us with moral novelties, that is, new problems that cannot be solved with the existing moral theories. Some of the most pressing problems in modern medical ethics, such as brain death and human enhancement, require considerations of issues that had not been covered in previously presented moral theories. The problem of moral novelties is also pervasive in the ethics of technology, due to its strong focus on new and emerging technologies, some of which have aspects that preexisting moral theories do not cover. This can be seen, for instance, from the discussions on information technology, virtual reality, space travel, and biotechnology, all of which refer to issues not foreseen in preexisting moral theories. Here as well we can note a stark contrast to mathematical and physical theory, both of which have a strong claim to timelessness.
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Another response to the difficulties in using moral theories in area-specific work is to replace them by principles that provide more distinct guidance in the respective areas. This is the approach commonly taken in medical ethics, whose “standard” approach is based on the following four principles:
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Our general contention is that the so-called “principles” function neither as adequate surrogates for moral theories nor as directives or guides for determining the morally correct action. Rather they are primarily chapter headings for a discussion of some concepts which are often only superficially related to each other. . . . The principles of Rawls and Mill are effective summaries of their theories; they are shorthand for the theories that generated them. However, this is not the case with principlism, because principlism often has two, three, or even four competing “principles” involved in a given case, for example, principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. This is tantamount to using two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case. Indeed some of the “principles”—for example, the “principle” of justice—contain within themselves several competing theories. (Clouser and Gert 1990, p. 221)
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IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OR ETHICAL ACTIVISM?
It is part of the ethos of science, and academic research in general, that investigations should aim at finding out what is, rather than postulating what ought to be. According to Robert K. Merton’s classic description of the value base of science, scientists are supposed to engage in an impersonal and disinterested search for the truth, and academic organizations should embody a form of organized skepticism that rectifies individual shortcomings in this respect (Merton [1942] 1973). For our present purposes we can leave it as an open question whether this ideal is desirable and feasible in other disciplines.
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As should be fairly obvious, there are situations in which the four principles run into conflict. There are no generally accepted guidelines for how to deal with such conflicts. Consequently, principlism differs from moral theories in lacking an all-encompassing mechanism for adjudicating between competing moral arguments. Instead, case-based intuitions about the relative Ethics is different since its subject matter consists of normative standpoints and their underpinnings. We cannot avoid talking about normative issues.
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However, this does not license us to present our own ethical standpoints as truths that every rational person must subscribe to. Statements made in ethics can be divided into four major categories:
Type 1: Empirical statements about nonnormative matter.
Type 2: Empirical statements about normative standpoints (such as psychological, sociological and historical reports about people’s normative attitudes).
Type 3: Analytical statements about normative standpoints (such as assertions about their implications and how they relate to other such standpoints).
Type 4: Advocacy of normative statements.
Statements of type 1 are important in ethics, since our ethical standpoints in concrete issues depend crucially on our factual beliefs about the world. For instance, in order to discuss the ethical aspects of climate policies we need to have a solid basis in climate science. Although it is not a task for ethicists to determine the validity of such statements, it is up to ethicists to summarize and present them in ways that clarify their ethical implications. Statements of type 2 are also important since many forms of ethical reasoning require adjustments to the standpoints of others. However, although statements of types 1 and 2 have important roles in ethics, they draw primarily on other competences than those of ethicists.
In contrast, statements of type 3 appertain to the core competences of ethicists. As ethicists we can identify normative issues and separate them out from complexes that have both normative and nonnormative components. We can dig out hidden assumptions and nonobvious implications, and we can point out alternative standpoints and clarify the differences. All of this can have an impact on the ethical judgments of those who take our counsel, but it can nevertheless be performed in the traditional academic spirit of striving to be as fair as possible to all standpoints and trying to identify one’s own biases and discuss them openly.
Statements of type 4 are different. When advocating normative standpoints we transcend the traditional limits of scholarship. Obviously there is nothing wrong with advocacy or activism in ethical issues, but in some circumstances it can reduce the credibility and therefore, also the impact of scholarly work that is reported in the same text or presentation. A common countermeasure is to clearly distinguish between what one says as a scholar, striving to be impartial between different standpoints, and as a proponent of one of these standpoints. However, there are two categories of normative statements that can usually be made without reservations. One is the category of uncontroversial morally wrong, we need not signal that we are making normative statements; these are assumptions that we can expect to be shared by all reasonable discussants. (This approach to uncontroversial norms is paralleled in other academic disciplines. Legal scholars usually take adherence to the rule of lawfor granted, and political scientists tend to do the same with human rights and basic democratic principles.)
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