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Tugendhat, Ernst. Vorlesungen über Ethik. 8. Aufl. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1100. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012.
Hier glaubte nun Kant, das Problem wie das Ei des Kolumbus lösen zu können, indem er vorschlug, die moralischen Urteile auf eine Prämisse zu begründen, die einfach die Idee des Begründetseins selbst darstellt, die Vernunft. Wenn man nur überhaupt vernünftig ist, so kann man seine Idee zusammenfassen, müsse man die Geltung der moralischen Urteile – bzw. derjenigen moralischen Urteile, die Kant für richtig hielt – anerkennen. ... Aus der Idee des Begründetseins als solcher kann, wenn man sich darunter überhaupt etwas vorstellen kann, überhaupt nichts Inhaltliches folgen. Außerdem werden wir noch sehen, dass nicht nur die Idee eines nicht mehr bedingten Begründetseins von oben, sondern auch die Idee, dass das moralische Sollen (oder Müssen) einen nicht bedingten Sinn hat – dass es irgendwie absolut über uns lastet, wie eine säkularisierte Stimme Gottes – sinnwidrig ist. (S. 24f)
Indem wir einsehen, dass das moralische Bewusstsein erst das Ergebnis eines – natürlich nicht unmotivierten – 'ich will' ist, überwinden wir die von fast allen traditionellen Ethiken – insbesondere der Kantischen – gemachte Annahme, das moralische Bewusstsein sei etwas in unser Bewusstsein von Natur eingerammtes. Es ist diese Annahme, die dazu geführt hat, die Moral, sei es von der menschlichen 'Natur' überhaupt, sei es von einem Aspekt von ihr wie der 'Vernunft', irgendwie ableiten zu wollen. (S. 62f)
Hansson, Sven Ove, Hrsg.The ethics of technology: methods and approaches. Philosophy, technology and society. London ; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd, 2017. S. 1ff
What does the term “applied” in “applied ethics” signify? It can be instructively compared to other applied disciplines. In applied mathematics, a mathematical theory is used to solve some problem outside of pure mathematics. The theory itself is not changed or significantly extended in the process of its application (Kopelman 1990). Similarly, applied physics makes extensive use of physical theory but does not aim at contributing to its development. In the same way, applied ethics can be seen as a discipline, or collection of disciplines, in which moral theory is used as a tool to solve moral problems in various practical areas. Some moral philosophers have indeed furthered that approach. Bernard Gert (1982, p. 51) defined applied ethics as “the application of an ethical theory to some particular moral problems or set of problems.” The most renowned proponent of this view is Peter Singer, who advocates the use of utilitarian moral theory to determine what is right and wrong in bioethics and other areas of applied ethics. However, most researchers in the various areas of applied ethics, including the ethics of technology, do not seem to concur (Beauchamp 1984; MacIntyre 1984; Pihlström 1999).
There are at least three serious problems with the idea that area-specific ethics should consist in the application of an ethical theory.
The first of these is the theory choice problem. There are quite a few moral theories around, and despite centuries of discussion moral philosophers have not managed to agree on which of them is right. To put it somewhat bluntly, moral philosophers tend to agree that one of the available moral theories is the one and only, correct theory. However, they do not agree on which that theory is. Therefore, the project of basing practical ethics on moral theory faces essentially the same problem as that of basing it on religion. Proponents of different religions tend to agree that there is one particular religion to which we should turn for guidance on moral and other issues, but they disagree on
which that religion is. For applied ethicists, the prevailing disagreement on which is the right moral theory can make the approach of “applying moral theory” seem arbitrary. This is in sharp contrast to applied mathematics and physics, both of which build on thoroughly validated theories that are not subject to serious doubt.
The The second problem is the derivation problem. For a moral theory to be useful in the intended way for applications, it would have to provide sufficient information for determining what is right and wrong in the various practical cases that applied ethicists are expected to analyze. When we have the facts of a case, it should be possible to combine these facts with the theory in question and derive univocally a determinate answer to our moral questions. However, this type of derivation does not usually work in practice since fundamental moral theories have surprisingly little to say on the problems that are the focus in applied ethics. This has become particularly evident in biomedical
ethics. Experience shows that the moral theory a philosopher adheres to has little or no predictive power for her standpoints on concrete bioethical issues (Kymlicka 1993; Heyd 1996). You can for instance find a utilitarian and a deontologist who agree on most of the ethical issues in health care, although they have different underpinnings for their standpoints. Similarly, two adherents of the same moral theory can disagree vehemently on practical moral issues since they apply it in different ways. The reason for this is that moral theories operate on an abstract level, and most practical moral problems cannot be connected in an unequivocal way to principles or standpoints on that level. For instance, deontologists can disagree on what duties we have and how they should be interpreted, and utilitarians can disagree in multifarious ways on the utilities of different outcomes (Hansson 2014b). The upshot is that even if we manage to choose one of the many available moral theories as the basis for applied ethics, that theory will not provide us with clear-cut answers to our ethical questions. This, again, is very different from the application of mathematical or physical theories that are essentially devoid of such ambiguities.
Thirdly, we have the moral novelty problem. Ideally, moral theories are thought of as timeless. If there is a unique, correct moral theory, then a sufficiently sagacious ancient thinker should—in principle—have been able to discover it. But the timelessness of moral theories can be put to serious doubt. Developments in human society unceasingly provide us with moral novelties, that is, new problems that cannot be solved with the existing moral theories. Some of the most pressing problems in modern medical ethics, such as brain death and human enhancement, require considerations of issues that had not been covered in previously presented moral theories. The problem of moral novelties is also pervasive in the ethics of technology, due to its strong focus on new and emerging technologies, some of which have aspects that preexisting moral theories do not cover. This can be seen, for instance, from the discussions on information technology, virtual reality, space travel, and biotechnology, all of which refer to issues not foreseen in preexisting moral theories. Here as well we can note a stark contrast to mathematical and physical theory, both of which have a strong claim to timelessness.
Applied ethics is far from the only applied discipline that fails to satisfy the strict definition of application referred to above. Most forms of applied science include the creation of genuinely new theory, for the simple reason that the theories developed in the basic sciences do not suffice for solving the applied problems. This is true, for instance, of applied linguistics and applied psychology. Arguably, application in the strict sense of using a theory as a tool without changing it is only possible if the theory in question is broad and exceptionless enough to cover unaided a whole area of knowledge. Major mathematical and physical theories answer to that description, but they seem to be the exception rather than the rule. As we have seen, a strong case can be made that ethical theory in its current form is not suitable for pure application. This does not necessarily mean that we should give up the term “applied ethics,” but we may have to define it differently than what we did above. The word “apply” also has the more general meaning of putting something to use. The ethics of technology is certainly ethics put to use, and the same is true of medical ethics, research ethics, etc. If application is interpreted in this way, as putting to use, then the term “applied ethics” is uncommitted on what role—if any—moral theory should have.
However, before throwing moral theories overboard, we need to consider carefully what we want to put in their place. Academic ethics should be able to provide a systematized account of our well-considered moral judgments and their implications. Moral theories are highly useful to achieve such systematicity. Presumably, we do not wish to be thrown back to just collecting and reporting prevailing moral opinions on the various issues we are studying. If we give up the idea of conducting applied ethics as a straightforward application of moral theory, then we need to find either some other way to use moral theories, or some other means than moral theories to achieve systematicity and cohesion.
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