Ward, Stephen J. A.Ethics and the Media: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977800. S. 17 ff
Practice and theory
Ethics is practical in intent, but theoretical in understanding. As noted, we reflect on our experiences, and reflection often leads us into the more abstract realms of theory, as we seek a deeper and more systematic view of the issues. Caught up in an ethical debate, we may ask: what types of statements are ethical statements anyway, and how do we justify them? Given a discussion of what promotes happiness, we may ask: but what is happiness for humans? Faced with conflicting moral views, we stand back and ask: which ethical view provides the best guidance, and why? These questions can have practical import. In many cases, our implicit or explicit theoretical assumptions affect what we judge to be ethical and how we should act.
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The theoretical-practical distinction, then, is a matter of degree. Some thinking is more practical or more theoretical than other forms of thinking. The difference is (a) the dominant interest of the thinking and (b) the types of reasons it uses. Practical problems are addressed to us as agents. The dominant interest is what to do. How can we solve a problem or achieve a goal? Theoretical problems are addressed to us as knowers. The dominant interest is what is true, or what to believe, and how to explain some phenomenon. For example, we want to know, theoretically, how sub-atomic forces explain the observable features of ordinary objects, or how certain genes predispose someone to skin cancer. Practical prob-
lems problems are resolved by developing the right practice. Theoretical problems are solved by coming to the right (or true) belief. Theoretical reasons are “reasons for believing” which support a proposition, while practical reasons are “reasons for acting” and support an action.
Ethics is practical because both its dominant interest and its reasons are practical. It seeks reasons for doing action x, not theoretical reasons for believing y. But ethics is not anti-theory. It is not so practical as to be averse to the careful analysis of ideas, to the raising of technical points, or to questions of principle. The purpose of theorizing is to illuminate our ethical experience, examine its tensions, expose assumptions, construct new principles, and improve our ethical responses. There is no saying, in advance, how theoretical or arcane our thinking must become to sort out an ethical issue. We should follow our thinking wherever it leads. To insist on a practical “anchor” for ethics is not to question the value of theory; it is to remind us that ethical theorizing should be grounded in practical questions. Theorizing in ethics can be divided into two groups:
Philosophical ethics: includes
(a) the nature of ethical statements and the meaning of ethical concepts; (
b) how we know, or come to agree on, ethical statements, plus their objectivity;
(c) the purpose(s) of ethics given certain theories of society and human nature; and
(d) the history of ethics.
Applied ethics: includes
(a) criteria of right and wrong; the supreme principle(s) of ethics;
(b) lower-level principles that guide how we should act in particular enterprises and professions;
(c) how principles apply to specific issues; and
(d) methods of reasoning.
As I will explain, applied ethics is divided into two parts: general normative theories about what principles and values should guide us in life; and a more specific “framework ethics” that focuses on codes of ethics for professions and other significant enterprises in society. Philosophical ethics (or “meta-ethics”) is called “philosophical” because it studies ethics at a high level of generality and detachment. We step outside the daily activity of making ethical judgments and examine (and explain) the activity of making ethical judgments. We adopt the view of an external observer who analyzes ethics as a social, psychological, and linguistic phenomenon. For example, if I stumble upon a wallet on my walk to work, I think to myself, “I ought to return the wallet to the owner.” I engage in practical ethical thinking to arrive at a conclusion for action. This is applied ethics, not philosophical ethics. I adopt the view of philosophical ethics to this experience if I step back and ask, for example, what “ought” means in such judgments. What is the source of such feelings of duty to return the wallet? What do I mean when I say returning the wallet is the right thing to do?
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We have already mentioned examples of applied theories, such as utilitarianism, which takes the good as the fundamental aspect of ethics. It declares that the greatest good is the greatest amount of happiness for all. On this basis, utilitarianism takes a wide array of positions on the moral issues of the day. To be sure, any applied theory such as utilitarianism contains philosophical reflections on the meaning of “good” and the objectivity of ethics. But the overwhelming intent of applied theories is practical.
Given this general understanding of the philosophical/applied distinction, we can now be more specific about the area that we are most concerned with in this book – applied ethics. As mentioned, applied ethics has two divisions, general and specific:
(1) normative ethics in general, which deals with general theories about what things are valuable, good, and right, what principles should belong to our general morality, and how they apply to our decisions and actions;
(2) framework ethics: the development, critique, and application of specific frameworks of principles, such as codes of ethics for the professions. Frameworks are sets of related principles that together govern an entire type of activity, e.g. the code of ethics for physicians or journalists. Framework ethics, of course, does not stand on its own. Applied ethics engages in both normative and framework ethics to study the practice of professions to help nurses, public servants, journalists, and others. Part of the analysis of these frameworks is to examine whether they are consistent with the more general theories of normative ethics, such as utilitarianism.
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