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However, before throwing moral theories overboard, we need to consider carefully what we want to put in their place. Academic ethics should be able to provide a systematized account of our well-considered moral judgments and their implications. Moral theories are highly useful to achieve such systematicity. Presumably, we do not wish to be thrown back to just collecting and reporting prevailing moral opinions on the various issues we are studying. If we give up the idea of conducting applied ethics as a straightforward application of moral theory, then we need to find either some other way to use moral theories, or some other means than moral theories to achieve systematicity and cohesion.5. REPLACEMENTS
REPLACEMENTS FOR MORAL THEORIES
Another response to the difficulties in using moral theories in area-specific
work is to replace them by principles that provide more distinct guidance in
the respective areas. This is the approach commonly taken in medical ethics,
whose “standard” approach is based on the following four principles:
- Autonomy: “Personal autonomy is, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from
...
- both controlling interferences by others and from limitations, such as inadequate
...
- understanding, that prevent a meaningful choice.”
- Non-maleficence: “The principle of nonmaleficence asserts an obligation not
...
- to inflict harm on others.”
- Beneficence: “Morality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously
...
- and refrain from harming them, but also that we contribute to their welfare.”
- Justice is “fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due
...
- or owed to persons.” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, pp. 58, 113, 165, 226)
Various practices and rules in medical ethics can be justified by these four
principles. For instance, the requirement of the patient’s informed consent for
medical interventions is based on the principle of autonomy, and the require-
ment requirement to offer treatment to all in need is based on the principle of justice.
These principles form the basis of the ethical education of most physicians
and other health-care personnel, and they are continuously referred to in ethi-
cal ethical committees around the globe. The term “principlism” was introduced by
Clouser and Gert (1990) to denote the ethical discourse that is based on them
(Beauchamp 1995, p. 186).
The four principles are usually conceived as intermediate between “low-
level” particular judgments and “high-level” moral theories such as utili-
tarianism utilitarianism and deontology. However, the practical employment of the four
principles does not hinge on their inclusion in a larger structure that also
includes some moral theory. Probably, most users of the principles lack a importance of the principles will have to be resorted to. Largely for that
reason, principlism tends to be less popular among moral philosophers than
among practicing physicians. The following is a forceful expression of that
criticism:
Our general contention is that the so-called “principles” function neither as
...
adequate surrogates for moral theories nor as directives or guides for
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determining the morally correct action. Rather they are primarily chapter headings for a
...
discussion of some concepts which are often only superficially related to each
...
other. . . . The principles of Rawls and Mill are effective summaries of their
...
theories; they are shorthand for the theories that generated them. However, this is
...
not the case with principlism, because principlism often has two, three, or even
...
four competing “principles” involved in a given case, for example, principles of
...
autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. This is tantamount to using
...
two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case. Indeed some of
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the “principles”—for example, the “principle” of justice—contain within
...
themselves several competing theories. (Clouser and Gert 1990, p. 221)
Some ethicists have wished to apply principlism to the ethics of technology.
However, it has not always been realized that—with the possible exception
of the ethics of medical technology—this will require extensive reworking of
the principles. A major reason for this is that clinical decision making has its
focus on an individual patient, whereas decisions on technology often con-
cern concern large and diverse groups of people who may well have conflicting inter-
estsinterests. For instance, the practice of informed consent cannot be transferred from
clinical medicine to the context of technological innovation and development,
since it would give single individuals veto power to stop projects with large
advantages for many others (Hansson 2006). The formulation of principlism
for (various forms of) technology remains to be performed. It may very well
be wellbe a worthwhile undertaking.6.
IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OR ETHICAL ACTIVISM?
It is part of the ethos of science, and academic research in general, that
investigations should aim at finding out what is, rather than postulating what
ought to be. According to Robert K. Merton’s classic description of the value
base of science, scientists are supposed to engage in an impersonal and dis-
interested disinterested search for the truth, and academic organizations should embody
a form of organized skepticism that rectifies individual shortcomings in this
respect (Merton [1942] 1973). For our present purposes we can leave it as an
open question whether this ideal is desirable and feasible in other disciplines.
determinate opinion on which—if any—higher-level criterion they should be
combined with...
As should be fairly obvious, there are situations in which the four prin-
ciples principles run into conflict. There are no generally accepted guidelines for how
to deal with such conflicts. Consequently, principlism differs from moral
theories in lacking an all-encompassing mechanism for adjudicating between
competing moral arguments. Instead, case-based intuitions about the relative Ethics is different since its subject matter consists of normative standpoints
and their underpinnings. We cannot avoid talking about normative issues.
However, this does not license us to present our own ethical standpoints as
truths that every rational person must subscribe to.
Statements made in ethics can be divided into four major categories:
Type 1: Empirical statements about nonnormative matter.
Type 2: Empirical statements about normative standpoints (such as psycholog-
icalpsychological, sociological and historical reports about people’s normative attitudes).
Type 3: Analytical statements about normative standpoints (such as assertions
about their implications and how they relate to other such standpoints).
Type 4: Advocacy of normative statements.
Statements of type 1 are important in ethics, since our ethical standpoints in
concrete issues depend crucially on our factual beliefs about the world. For
instance, in order to discuss the ethical aspects of climate policies we need to
have a solid basis in climate science. Although it is not a task for ethicists to
determine the validity of such statements, it is up to ethicists to summarize
and present them in ways that clarify their ethical implications. Statements
of type 2 are also important since many forms of ethical reasoning require
adjustments to the standpoints of others. However, although statements of
types 1 and 2 have important roles in ethics, they draw primarily on other
competences than those of ethicists.
In contrast, statements of type 3 appertain to the core competences of
ethicists. As ethicists we can identify normative issues and separate them out
from complexes that have both normative and nonnormative components.
We can dig out hidden assumptions and nonobvious implications, and we can
point out alternative standpoints and clarify the differences. All of this can
have an impact on the ethical judgments of those who take our counsel, but it
can nevertheless be performed in the traditional academic spirit of striving to
be as fair as possible to all standpoints and trying to identify one’s own biases
and discuss them openly.
Statements of type 4 are different. When advocating normative standpoints
we transcend the traditional limits of scholarship. Obviously there is nothing
wrong with advocacy or activism in ethical issues, but in some circumstances it
can reduce the credibility and therefore, also the impact of scholarly work that
is reported in the same text or presentation. A common countermeasure is to
clearly distinguish between what one says as a scholar, striving to be impartial
between different standpoints, and as a proponent of one of these standpoints.
However, there are two categories of normative statements that can usu-
ally usually be made without reservations. One is the category of uncontroversial morally wrong, we need not signal that we are making normative statements;
these are assumptions that we can expect to be shared by all reasonable
discussants. (This approach to uncontroversial norms is paralleled in other
academic disciplines. Legal scholars usually take adherence to the rule of law
for lawfor granted, and political scientists tend to do the same with human rights and
basic democratic principles.)
The other exception is normative statements that follow from the con-
sensus consensus view in an area with well-established ethical canons. There are two
such areas, namely, medical ethics and research ethics. For instance, we can
without hesitation say that it is unethical to administer a drug surreptitiously
in a mentally competent person’s food, or to expose an unprepared research
subject to an incident that makes her fear for her life. In a professional ethics
context, the proviso “according to the consensus in medical/research ethics”
is mostly self-evident and therefore superfluous.
As ethicists we have a valid claim to expertise in norm-related issues
of type 3, that is, analytical issues concerning norms. In contrast, we have
no such claim in issues of type 4, that is, the actual choice of a normative
standpoint. However, we have the same right as everyone else to express our
opinions in those issues. We should feel perfectly free to do so, but it is a
matter of professional responsibility never to profess an expertise that we do
not possess.