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Die Informations- und Medienethik wird üblicher Weise als eine angewandte Ethik verstanden. Eine solche Klassifizierung setzt dabei ein bestimmtes wissenschaftssystematisches Verständnis voraus: Was angewandte Ethik ist, wovon sich eine angewandte Ethik abgrenzt und was ihr Spezifikum ist, ist nicht von vorne herein klar und bedarf einer Diskussion. Die Klärung der Frage, wie die Informations- und Medienethik als angewandte Ethik verstanden werden kann, betrifft das Selbstverständnis der Informations- und Medienethik in entscheidender Weise. Insofern ist die angewandte Ethik und die wissenschaftliche Diskussion um ihre Methoden, Leistungen und Aufgaben ein bedeutender Kontext der Informations- und Medienethik.
Ward, Stephen J. A.Ethics and the Media: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977800. S. 17 ff
Practice and theory
Ethics is practical in intent, but theoretical in understanding. As noted,
we reflect on our experiences, and reflection often leads us into the more
abstract realms of theory, as we seek a deeper and more systematic view of
the issues. Caught up in an ethical debate, we may ask: what types of state-
ments are ethical statements anyway, and how do we justify them? Given a
discussion of what promotes happiness, we may ask: but what is happiness
for humans? Faced with conflicting moral views, we stand back and ask:
which ethical view provides the best guidance, and why? These questions
can have practical import. In many cases, our implicit or explicit theoretical
assumptions affect what we judge to be ethical and how we should act.
In the circle of experience and reflection, practice and theory both
play an important part, and they inevitably interact. Theory and practice,
in ethics or elsewhere, are not separate spheres of life: a sphere of ideas
isolated from the world, and a practical world hostile to ideas. There is
almost no theoretical reflection where some amount of practical thinking
does not intrude; and no sphere of practical thinking devoid of theory.
Our thinking is like a rope of tightly compressed theoretical and practical
strands that are difficult to untangle. A good deal of our theoretical think-
ing, such as our view of what constitutes justice or freedom, is influenced
by how such views would work in practice. Practical problems, such as
how to dig a train tunnel under a river, have theoretical aspects. Many
professions, such as medicine, combine intimately the theoretical and the
practical. In academia, we study a practical activity theoretically, or study
a theory practically by examining its applications.
The theoretical-practical distinction, then, is a matter of degree. Some
thinking is more practical or more theoretical than other forms of think-
ing. The difference is (a) the dominant interest of the thinking and (b) the
types of reasons it uses. Practical problems are addressed to us as agents.
The dominant interest is what to do. How can we solve a problem or
achieve a goal? Theoretical problems are addressed to us as knowers. The
dominant interest is what is true, or what to believe, and how to explain
some phenomenon. For example, we want to know, theoretically, how
sub-atomic forces explain the observable features of ordinary objects,
or how certain genes predispose someone to skin cancer. Practical prob-
lems are resolved by developing the right practice. Theoretical problems
are solved by coming to the right (or true) belief. Theoretical reasons are
“reasons for believing” which support a proposition, while practical rea-
sons are “reasons for acting” and support an action. 7
Ethics is practical because both its dominant interest and its reasons
are practical. It seeks reasons for doing action x, not theoretical reasons for
believing y. But ethics is not anti-theory. It is not so practical as to be averse
to the careful analysis of ideas, to the raising of technical points, or to ques-
tions of principle. The purpose of theorizing is to illuminate our ethical
experience, examine its tensions, expose assumptions, construct new prin-
ciples, and improve our ethical responses. There is no saying, in advance,
how theoretical or arcane our thinking must become to sort out an ethical
issue. We should follow our thinking wherever it leads. To insist on a prac-
tical “anchor” for ethics is not to question the value of theory; it is to remind
us that ethical theorizing should be grounded in practical questions.
Theorizing in ethics can be divided into two groups:
Philosophical ethics: includes (a) the nature of ethical statements and the
meaning of ethical concepts; (b) how we know, or come to agree on,
ethical statements, plus their objectivity; (c) the purpose(s) of ethics
given certain theories of society and human nature; and (d) the his-
tory of ethics.
Applied ethics: includes (a) criteria of right and wrong; the supreme
principle(s) of ethics; (b) lower-level principles that guide how
we should act in particular enterprises and professions; (c) how
principles apply to specific issues; and (d) methods of reasoning.8 As
I will explain, applied ethics is divided into two parts: general nor-
mative theories about what principles and values should guide us in
life; and a more specific “framework ethics” that focuses on codes of
ethics for professions and other significant enterprises in society.
Philosophical ethics (or “meta-ethics”) is called “philosophical” because
it studies ethics at a high level of generality and detachment. We step
outside the daily activity of making ethical judgments and examine (and
explain) the activity of making ethical judgments. We adopt the view of an
external observer who analyzes ethics as a social, psychological, and lin-
guistic phenomenon. For example, if I stumble upon a wallet on my walk
to work, I think to myself, “I ought to return the wallet to the owner.”
I engage in practical ethical thinking to arrive at a conclusion for action.
This is applied ethics, not philosophical ethics. I adopt the view of philo-
sophical ethics to this experience if I step back and ask, for example, what
“ought” means in such judgments. What is the source of such feelings of
duty to return the wallet? What do I mean when I say returning the wallet
is the right thing to do?
In contrast, applied ethics is just that – applied. It seeks practical conclu-
sions about the right thing to do and to marshal reasons for doing it. It is
interested in identifying duties, rights, and practical principles for guid-
ing action. In applied ethics, we work within ethics. We engage ethical
situations and issues, directly. We do not step outside and observe ethics
as a human phenomenon. To the contrary, we are actors who do ethics
with a dominant practical interest. We argue for the application of certain
ethical principles in controversial cases. In applied ethics, we ask such
questions as, “did I do the wrong thing when I refused to give money to
famine relief?” or “is euthanasia morally justifiable if the dying person is
in extreme pain?”
Theories in applied ethics are not abstract theories focused on what
“good” or “right” means, or why humans have constructed ethical systems.
A “theory” in applied ethics is a general view about what actually is good
or right or virtuous, in general or in a domain of life. Typically, an applied
ethics theory has a distinct view of the three great themes of ethics – what
the good life consists of, what is right (or what justice requires), and what
the virtues are. Typically, an applied ethics theory advances a view of how
these themes are related and which is the most important aspect of ethical
life. An applied ethics theory also must explain what its perspective means
for leading issues. For instance, where does utilitarianism, communitar-
ian ethics, or Christian ethics stand on such issues as animal rights, our
obligations to future generations, or a just immigration policy? The appli-
cation of theory is crucial for applied ethics. Values such as respect for life,
friendship, or happiness, can be so abstract that we need to see how people
apply these values to identify where we agree or disagree. After all, both
the Quakers and the mafia agree on the value of friendship. 9
We have already mentioned examples of applied theories, such as utili-
tarianism, which takes the good as the fundamental aspect of ethics. It
declares that the greatest good is the greatest amount of happiness for all.
On this basis, utilitarianism takes a wide array of positions on the moral
issues of the day. To be sure, any applied theory such as utilitarianism con-
tains philosophical reflections on the meaning of “good” and the objectiv-
ity of ethics. But the overwhelming intent of applied theories is practical.
Given this general understanding of the philosophical/applied distinc-
tion, we can now be more specific about the area that we are most con-
cerned with in this book – applied ethics. As mentioned, applied ethics
has two divisions, general and specific: (1) normative ethics in general,
which deals with general theories about what things are valuable, good,
and right, what principles should belong to our general morality, and how
they apply to our decisions and actions; (2) framework ethics: the develop-
ment, critique, and application of specific frameworks of principles, such
as codes of ethics for the professions. Frameworks are sets of related prin-
ciples that together govern an entire type of activity, e.g. the code of ethics
for physicians or journalists. Framework ethics, of course, does not stand
on its own. Applied ethics engages in both normative and framework eth-
ics to study the practice of professions to help nurses, public servants, jour-
nalists, and others. Part of the analysis of these frameworks is to examine
whether they are consistent with the more general theories of normative
ethics, such as utilitarianism.
Framework ethics asks about the validity, coherence, interpretation, and
adequacy of the framework, as well as the validity of specific principles. For
example, in journalism we can question whether the existing professional
code of ethics is adequate for changes happening in journalism, where
citizen journalists become increasingly important. Or we can question a
specific principle such as the doctrine of news objectivity. Framework eth-
ics is focused not on the justification of the framework of principles, but
on how the principles apply to situations to yield judgments about what
to do. For example, if we accept objectivity as a principle of news report-
ing, what does it entail for the coverage of my country’s military actions?
The professions use framework ethics to question their principles and to
study the dilemmas and tough “judgment-calls” specific to their domains.
For example, how much information should a doctor provide a seriously
ill patient about their disease? How should a health organization inform
female patients that their breast cancer tests were botched by pathologists?
What is “informed consent” in a business contract? If a financial adviser
owns stock in a company, should he promote that company to clients?